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Counterfeit parts have the potential to cause a serious disruption to Department of Defense 
(DoD) supply chains, delay ongoing missions, and affect the integrity of weapons systems 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010). Incredibly, the number of counterfeit parts in 
electronic military systems more than doubled between 2005 and 2008, rising from 3,868 
incidents to 9,356 incidents (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010). The range of counterfeited 
goods is wide, and it is growing. The rise of e-commerce, extended international supply chains, 
stronger reliance on overseas manufacturing, and, more recently, the global economic recession 
have significantly contributed to the proliferation of counterfeit goods (“Knock Offs Catch On,” 
2010). Almost anything can be counterfeited, including fasteners used on aircraft and materials 
used in body armor and engine mounts. In some instances, lives may be at stake.  
Today, technology development and production are globally dispersed. As a result, the U.S. 
defense industrial base has undergone a sea change in its composition, becoming increasingly 
reliant on international sources for its development, production, and provision, particularly at the 
subsystems and parts levels. Non-U.S. firms are major players within the U.S. defense industrial 
base, often with major engineering and production subsidiaries in the United States. Both U.S. 
and non-U.S. defense firms have rapidly and dramatically increased their reliance on foreign 
suppliers, especially for the acquisition of commodities, circuit boards, semi-conductors, and 
other electronic parts and components. In fact, virtually all U.S weapons systems manufactured 
today contain foreign parts. This arrangement has allowed the United States to acquire superior 
systems, reduce costs, increase the number of units produced, and improve deployment times 
(Moran, 1990). But it has also heightened supply chain vulnerability. 
If the proliferation of global defense firms and suppliers presents risks, so does the consolidation 
of the U.S. defense industrial base. A string of defense firm mergers in the 1990s resulted in 
significant industry consolidation. The number of major U.S.-based defense and aerospace 
companies shrunk from 21 in 1993 to six today. 
This consolidation (which included considerable vertical integration, with the primes absorbing 
many of the suppliers) also had an impact at the lower levels, with many of the remaining 
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suppliers moving much of their business to the commercial sector. These suppliers could no 
longer rely on the DoD to provide the majority of their business. In many critical defense areas, 
the number of suppliers remaining—at either the prime contractor or lower-tier levels—is down 
to only one or two. This smaller network of trusted global suppliers can lead to difficulties in 
acquiring parts, especially replacement parts that are no longer manufactured by the original 
producer. As a result, the defense industry must look to foreign suppliers with whom it has no 
prior relationship.  
As far as the DoD is concerned, counterfeit electronic components merit greatest concern. In 
2012, the Committee on Armed Services uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of 
counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems. According to the report, the 
investigation “exposed a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unvetted independent 
distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive defense systems” 
(Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p.1). Between 2009 and 2010, the investigation 
uncovered 1,800 cases of suspect counterfeit electronic parts, with the total number of individual 
suspect parts exceeding more than a million. Suspect counterfeit parts were discovered in critical 
weapons systems, including Navy helicopters and Air Force cargo jets.  
Counterfeit electronics may take the form of functional knock-offs made in chip factories that 
pirate the designs of other chips. More commonly, counterfeiters apply fake markings to lower 
quality or less sophisticated chips in an effort to pass them off as more expensive chips. 
It can be especially challenging to ensure that the acquired electronic components are genuine, 
given this industry’s relatively quick innovation cycles. Many active military systems were built 
using now-obsolete components, the production of which was halted years, even decades, ago by 
the original manufacturer. This creates a business opportunity for vendors to sell “new old 
stock,” which, in turn, creates traction for the manufacture of semiconductors made from 
recycled, broken, fake, or otherwise inauthentic parts.  
Various industries have developed rigorous counterfeit detection and prevention processes. For 
instance SAE International, an aerospace industry group, developed an anti-counterfeit standard 
that requires, notably, that companies complete a risk assessment, and provide for external 
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auditing, ongoing testing and inspection, supply chain traceability, and penalties associated with 
fraud (SAE, 2013). The standard is intended to inform individualized requirements that are 
commensurate with program risk, and are intended to be “flowed down” through the supply 
chain by all organizations that procure electronic parts. The requirements are to be enforced via 
contract specifications (SAE, 2013). 
NASA was the first government agency to adopt SAE International AS5553 on November 3, 
2008, before the official release of the plan (NASA, 2013). The DoD followed suit in August 
2009, requiring that the standard be used for internal purchasing purposes; however, the DoD 
does not require that its contractors adhere to this specific standard.  
The pharmaceuticals industry is another leader in the development of rigorous anti-counterfeit 
processes. For example, tamper-evident packaging using plastic seals, outside lids, and seals 
between lids and containers protect consumer medicines. Recently, The U.S.-Member Body for 
the IEC Quality Assessment System for Electronic Components discussed the potential use of 
tamper-evident packaging for sensitive electronic parts and components, noting that it might 
provide “a level of confidence when dealing with returns” and thus has the potential for lowering 
handling costs (Salot, 2011). 
The pharmaceutical industry also uses track and trace technologies, which allow companies to 
determine the current and past locations of items. However, the use of these technologies present 
challenges. For instance, the significant costs associated with implementation can prove 
problematic. Moreover, there is no single, interoperable technology upon which all parties rely. 
The DoD faces similar challenges. In November 2012, the DoD began using plant DNA to mark 
microcircuits. The DNA can be mixed with inks or infused into the actual materials like silicon, 
plastics, and wires (Freedberg, 2012). But DNA tagging does not eliminate the problem of 
currently circulating counterfeit parts in secondary markets. Moreover, because the DoD is not 
the largest buyer of microelectronics, the private sector market must buy into DNA tagging in 
order for manufacturers to include this anti-counterfeit measure on all products. 
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The DoD has not adopted the aerospace standard, nor has it developed its own. And given the 
difficulty in establishing uniform track and trace processes, as well as the uncertaintly regarding 
the value of tamper-evident packaging and other technologies, the DoD has come to rely 
primarily on contractor reporting, the development of trusted networks of suppliers, and, to a 
lesser extent, the testing of parts and components in order to reduce the incidence of 
counterfeiting.  
On a legislative front, Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
Year 2012 (enacted in December 2011) contains new mandates for the DoD to mitigate the threat 
of counterfeit electronic parts. Of most note, Section 818 stipulates that contractors “who supply 
electronic parts or products … are responsible for detecting and avoiding the use or inclusion of 
counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts.” Also significant, the law 
stipulates that the DoD and all DoD contractors and subcontractors must “whenever possible” 
obtain electronic parts from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or their authorized 
dealers, or from “trusted suppliers” that obtain parts exclusively from OEMs or their authorized 
dealers. Finally, the law also required contractors and subcontractors to report counterfeit parts 
using the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) or some other designated 
counterfeit reporting system.  
Section 818 also called for establishing department-wide definitions of the terms ‘‘counterfeit 
electronic part,’’ and directed DoD programs to implement a risk-based approach to minimize 
the impact of counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts on the 
Department (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012). Also of note, the law called for the revision of 
guidance on remedial actions to be taken in the case of a supplier who has repeatedly failed to 
detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts. 
The DoD has proposed to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) in order to meet some of these requirements. Final action is expected in early 2014. 
The proposed DFARS addresses some ongoing problems but creates new challenges. This 
supplement was supposed to be released for comment by September 2012 but was delayed by 
more than seven months. Contractors were dismayed to learn that, according to the guidance, 
firms had to devise their own “acceptable counterfeit electronic parts avoidance and detection 
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systems” (DFARS, 2012). Insofar as the guidance prescribed specific processes and procedures, 
it was wholly inadequate. In addition, the new guidance failed to adequately refine the definition 
of trusted supplier and made no mention of the role that the DoD, or other government customer, 
would play (if any) with regard to source approval. Again, given that liability rested solely with 
the contractor, this shortcoming in the DFARS was perceived as unfair by many within the 
contractor community. 
This approach is not consistent with the DoD’s internal practices. Regarding the DoD’s own 
purchasing practices, Section 818 directs the DoD to implement a risk-based approach in an 
effort to prevent the inclusion of counterfeit parts (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012). Metzger (2013) 
noted that by describing an approach as “risk-based,” the DoD has tacitly acknowledged that “it 
is impossible to eliminate all risk of counterfeit in every system that the DoD buys or supports” 
(p. 3). Thus, Metzger (2013), Livingston (2013), and others conclude that contractor liability 
should be limited to some extent based on the “best efforts” of contractors to avoid the inclusion 
of counterfeit parts.  
Another problem is that the definition of counterfeit part contained in the DFARS (2012)) 
includes what, in the commercial sector, would be described simply as “nonconforming.” 
According to subparagraph 3 of the new DFARS rule, a counterfeit part includes items 
“misrepresented by any source to the end-user as meeting the performance requirements for the 
intended use.” Livingston (2013) noted that this definition could include “an out of spec item due 
to a temporary lapse of manufacturing and testing process control” (p. 5).  
Although the DFARS guidance is deficient in some respects, some of the criticism aimed at the 
supplement is clearly ill advised. According to the supplement, firms that are not subject to cost 
accounting standards because of their smaller size are not required by law to establish and 
maintain a detection and prevention system. Representatives of large firms have taken aim at this 
exception, pointing out that because the vast majority of suppliers associated with the sale of 
suspect counterfeit parts are small, lower-level sub-contractors, independent distributors, or 
brokers, the law should require that these entities maintain anti-counterfeit systems.  
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Of course, large contractors can and should require their subcontractors and suppliers to take 
steps to avoid counterfeit parts and may go so far as to hold these lower-tier entities partially or 
fully liable for remediation in the event that counterfeit parts are discovered. Moreover, the flow 
down of anti-counterfeit measures is already a component of the SAE standards and is one of the 
elements of an adequate counterfeit detection system per Section 818 (NDAA, 2011). Large 
firms, it might be argued, were seeking a legal mandate in order to avoid the legwork of 
establishing flow-down requirements, monitoring subcontractors and suppliers, and ensuring 
compliance. 
It appears that Congress has come to realize that the incidence of counterfeit parts cannot be fully 
eliminated. Section 833 of the 2013 NDAA includes amendments to Section 818, allowing a 
contractor to seek reimbursement for the cost of counterfeit remediation provided that it has an 
approved operational system to detect and avoid counterfeit parts. 
The threat of counterfeit parts within the DoD’s supply chain is real. We can anticipate that that 
threat will only escalate over time, with potentially serious consequences. The DoD must address 
the threat of counterfeit parts in the supply chain; however, the solutions must take into account 
the budgetary constraints that the department faces and will likely continue to face for some 
time. It is critical that the DoD find an appropriate and acceptable balance between risks and 
costs.  
This balance is reflected in the recommendations provided below, which fall into three high-level 
categories: (1) strengthen standards, (2) implement stronger preventive measures, and (3) 
develop a long-term strategy. 
Strengthen Standards  
• The DoD should require contractors to rely on recognized standards, such as SAE 
AS5553, in devising its counterfeit detection and mitigation procedures.  
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• DoD program managers should partner with program contractors to determine an 
appropriate, individualized, risk-based approach to counterfeit mitigation that adheres to 
established standards. 
• The DoD should enforce quality assurance standards, recognizing that nonconforming 
parts threaten weapons system integrity and may lead to costly remediation. 
Implement Stronger Preventive Measures 
• The DoD should, where appropriate, encourage the use of existing deterrents (e.g., 
tamper-proof packaging, x-ray inspection) while developing new anti-counterfeiting 
technologies. 
• Debar suppliers who repeatedly furnish parts or components containing counterfeit parts. 
 
• The DoD should require foreign companies to report suspect counterfeits using GIDEP, 
and provide penalties for non-compliance. 
Develop a Long-Term Strategy  
• The DoD should focus on best value, as opposed to lowest cost, in its acquisition of 
critical technologies. 
 
• The DoD should minimize the impact of obsolescence by using (to the extent possible) 
parts and components for which multiple sources exist. Where this is not possible, the 
DoD must develop a robust obsolescence management strategy. 
• The United States should strive to retain its design capabilities for critical technologies.  
The threat of counterfeit parts within DoD’s supply chain is real and will only escalate over time, 
with potentially serious consequences. In order to reduce this threat, the DoD and its industry 
partners will have to work together to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, at an affordable cost. 
While both parties may have the best intentions, it is essential that any incentives, penalties, and 




In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) discovered that counterfeit memory chips had made 
their way into computers controlling America’s primary missile defense system, the Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD; Johnson, 2012a). The discovery reignited debate 
among DoD officials, members of Congress, and defense industry groups over liability for 
counterfeit parts in weapons systems, a contentious issue that has received more attention over 
the last decade as defense contractors have worked to expand their networks of global 
suppliers—some of whom, it appears, cannot be trusted.  
During a congressional hearing, Michigan Senator Carl Levin asserted that “there is no reason on 
earth that the replacement of a counterfeit part should be paid for by American taxpayers, instead 
of by the contractor who put it in a military system” (Johnson, 2012a, p. 1). Pentagon officials 
tended to agree, and in the case of the THAAD, charged the primary contractor, Lockheed 
Martin, for replacement costs totaling $2.7 million.  
At first glance, holding contractors responsible for the remediation of counterfeit parts in DoD 
systems seems reasonable enough, especially considering that the high cost of remediation serves 
an essential purpose: to incentivize contractors to establish more rigorous policies and 
procedures to prevent counterfeit parts from entering their supply chains.  
In today’s budgetary environment, however, both government agencies and contractors face 
continuous pressure to reduce costs while improving performance and reliability. Implementing 
new supply chain security mandates while attempting to reduce acquisition costs will pose a 
challenge. Under the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), DoD contractors are 
already required, whenever possible, to purchase parts and components from the original 
manufacturers (either the original equipment manufacturer [OEM] or the original component 
manufacturer [OCM]), their authorized dealers, or “trusted suppliers,” a term that has yet to be 
adequately defined. As a result, contractors have had to establish separate supply chains—those 
upon which they rely for government business and those that they use to meet their commercial 
business needs. Needless to say, the narrowing of supply chains has led to increased costs that 
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contractors pass along to their government customers, an outcome that is seemingly at odds with 
the DoD’s current spending reduction priority.  
It is projected that the DoD will see a funding reduction of $487 billion over the next 10 years 
(Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2012). Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) found that the DoD’s 2013 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a five-year spending 
plan provided to Congress, fails to bring down spending to a sustainable level. In fact, the CBO 
believes that the DoD’s costs will soon outstrip its budget as expenditures for manpower, 
maintenance, and healthcare continue to increase, thereby eliminating the funds necessary for the 
planned recapitalization, modernization, and transformation of the military (CBO, 2013). The 
DoD must make hard decisions in order to prevent such an outlook from becoming a reality. 
With regard to counterfeit detection and prevention, reaching an appropriate balance between 
risks and costs is critical. 
Unfortunately, recent approaches to reducing costs may be having the opposite effect. The 
DoD’s increased use of lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection criteria—
according to which the government agency awards the contract to the offeror submitting the 
lowest price proposal that meets the technical requirements—may indirectly encourage the 
inclusion of counterfeit parts followed by costly remediation. Larry Allen, the president of 
consulting firm Allen Federal Business Partners, put it this way: “While contractors should not 
be off the hook, the government can’t expect to pay discount prices for real stuff or real product” 
(Johnson, 2012a, p. 18).  
Sometimes lost in the debate is the fact that counterfeit parts and components can greatly affect 
the safety, operational readiness, cost, and critical nature of the military mission. Counterfeit 
parts have the potential to cause a serious disruption to DoD supply chains, delay ongoing 
missions, and even affect the integrity of weapons systems (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2010). Almost anything can be counterfeited, including fasteners used on aircraft, 
electronics used in missile guidance systems, and materials used in body armor and engine 
mounts. In some instances, lives may be at stake.  
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As mentioned, the DoD’s sourcing supply chain, like that of any other large enterprise, has 
become increasingly global. The DoD procures millions of parts through its logistics support 
providers—Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supply centers, military service depots, and 
defense contractors—who are responsible for ensuring the reliability of the DoD parts that they 
procure. Never an easy task, the challenge of assuring the integrity and provenance of parts and 
components has grown geometrically more complex in this global sourcing environment. 
Visibility into supplier operations is often quite limited, quality controls are insufficient, and 
chain of custody verification is lacking.  
Additionally, as DoD weapons systems age, products required to support them may no longer be 
available from the original manufacturers or through franchised or authorized suppliers. Instead, 
the DoD must turn to independent distributors, brokers, or aftermarket manufacturers as sources 
of supply. Here again, the DoD is at risk for acquiring counterfeit parts. Counterfeiters, for their 
part, have developed more sophisticated capabilities in recent years, making detection all the 
more difficult. This much, then, is clear: in this environment, the DoD must step up its war 
against counterfeit parts.  
 
Report Roadmap 
This report will provide a thorough exploration of the issue of counterfeit parts within the 
defense supply chain. We begin in Part II by discussing the impact of the rapid globalization of 
the defense industry on the proliferation of counterfeit parts. In Part III, we describe various 
manifestations of counterfeiting in the commercial sector, with particular emphasis on electronic 
parts and components. Then, we assess the current and potential threat of counterfeit parts 
infiltrating the DoD’s acquisition chain, including analyzing areas of highest vulnerability and 
risk. Next, in Part IV, we analyze how some industries (e.g., pharmaceuticals and aerospace) 
address the counterfeit parts issue, reviewing successful best practices and counterfeiting-
prevention models and processes. In Part V, we review DoD efforts to mitigate this threat across 
the acquisition cycle, within the services and defense agencies. We also explore the challenges 
involved in implementing anti-counterfeiting procedures across the DoD’s supply chain. Finally, 
in Part VI, we present our recommendations and discuss potential barriers to success. 
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II. Evolution of the Defense Industry  
The emergence of a global defense industrial base has allowed the DoD to take advantage of 
increased competition and innovation, leading to the acquisition of superior systems that are 
more affordable. However, as a consequence of globalization, the U.S. has grown more 
dependent on offshore sources for defense-related technologies, especially in critical, lower tier 
component areas. The proliferation of counterfeit parts and components in DoD systems, broadly 
speaking, can be significantly attributed to the rapid globalization of the defense industry. 
Entrance of the Commercial Sector 
Before and during the Cold War, much of the nation’s research and development investment was 
concentrated on defense. The resultant technologies (e.g., jet propulsion, satellites, and 
computers) were then adapted (“spun off”) to civilian and commercial applications. The end of 
the Cold War was coincident with the start of the information revolution, and research 
investments began to focus on commercial applications. There was also a significant increase in 
the global investment in research and development (R&D), so that now it is greater than the total 
U.S. investment (see Figure 1).  
	   Cold War (1965) 
End of Cold War 
(1993) 2009 
U.S. Government $60B $75B $80B 
U.S. Commercial $90B $200B $300B 
Rest of World Unknown $300B $450B 
Figure 1. R&D investment  
Note. The information in this figure comes from the Army Science Board (2013). 
The entrance of the commercial sector into advanced information technology R&D created 
another option for the defense industry to consider when purchasing and adapting systems and 
technology for military use. In 1999, the Defense Science Board (DSB) concluded that 
the commercial sector, which pays scant attention to national boundaries, is now 
driving the development of much of the advanced technology integrated into modern 
information-intensive military systems. This is especially true of the Software and 
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consumer microelectronics sectors. Accordingly, U.S. military-technological 
advantage will derive less from advanced component and subsystem technology 
developed by the U.S. defense sector than from the military functionality generated 
by superior, though not necessarily U.S.-based, defense sector systems integration 
skills. (p. 8)  
The commercial sector continues to invest heavily in developing and advancing technologies, 
often outpacing similar work performed by the defense industrial base. As early as 1986, upon 
the publication of the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management report (“the 
Packard Commission”), it was clear that commercial technologies regularly outperformed their 
“MIL-SPEC” counterparts, and that they could be procured at far lower costs. The availability of 
high-quality, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software has netted significant 
savings to the DoD, in terms of systems development and maintenance (McKinney, 2001). It is 
clear that the vector of technology transfer has reversed, and defense increasingly strives to adapt 
the latest commercial developments and products.  
Proliferation of Global Defense Firms 
The formerly segregated defense industries of Western countries have begun to transform 
themselves into a global, more commercially oriented industry. They have done so through 
consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and integrations that cross national 
boundaries. It should be noted that the globalization of the defense industry began at both ends— 
by U.S. defense firms seeking foreign markets, and by foreign defense firms seeking an entry 
into the largest of all markets for defense goods, the United States.  
During the infancy of the semiconductor industry, a single company performed specification, 
design, manufacturing, and testing (Villasenor, 2013). As the technology evolved, and the 
semiconductors became smaller and more complex, the costs of in-house manufacturing became 
prohibitive. As is the case in many industries, it became cheaper for a company to send design 
specifications to an external facility that would manufacture semiconductors for multiple entities, 
thereby capturing economies of scale and reducing production costs. As a result, semiconductor 
technology continues to evolve, leading to the production of ever-advancing systems that are 
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superior to their predecessors. However, semiconductors are among the electronic parts that are 
most prone to counterfeiting and other forms of manipulation.  
Today, technology development and production are globally dispersed. As a result, the U.S. 
defense industrial base has undergone a sea change in its composition, becoming increasingly 
reliant on international sources for its development, production, and provision. Non-U.S. firms 
are major players within the U.S. defense industrial base, often with major engineering and 
production subsidiaries in the U.S. Both U.S. and non-U.S. defense firms have rapidly and 
dramatically increased their reliance on foreign suppliers, especially for the acquisition of 
commodities, circuit boards, semi-conductors, and other electronic parts and components.  
The defense industry’s reliance on foreign suppliers reflects a growing trend that cuts across 
virtually all industries. The number of U.S. companies that source internationally has increased 
dramatically over the last 40 years. According to Trent and Roberts (2010), total purchases from 
non-U.S. sources by U.S. firms have increased from less than 10% of total purchases in the early 
1990s to more than 25% in 2000. Today, the figure likely stands at around 20% (Trent & 
Roberts, 2010). The increase in international purchasing can be attributed to the growing 
competitive pressure to lower costs in order to realize larger profits. This pressure, once 
constrained by geographic and then national boundaries and trade embargos, has evolved into a 
global force.  
In 2012, 20 aerospace and defense firms made the Forbes Global 2000 List of the largest public 
companies operating in the global market. Eleven of these firms have their headquarters based 
outside of the United States (see Figure 2), including BAE Systems, EADS, and Thales. Foreign 
firms have increasingly established themselves as part of the U.S. aerospace and defense 
industry. By purchasing U.S. companies or establishing U.S. subsidiaries, these foreign defense 
companies have gained a significant foothold in the largest defense market in the world, 
contributing in large part to the domestic U.S. economy.  
These firms regularly compete alongside Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing for 
contracts with the U.S. government. Moreover, these companies often work with each other 
across national boundaries. As a result, the U.S. relies, and must continue to rely, on multiple 
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firms, foreign and domestic that, in turn, rely on multiple, disparate networks of suppliers. More 
often than not, this arrangement has led to the U.S. acquisition of superior systems while 
allowing the DoD to reduce costs, increase the number of units produced, and improve 
deployment times (Moran, 1990). But it has also heightened supply chain vulnerability.  
 
Figure 2. Market value of the largest global public aerospace and defense companies 
Note. The information in this figure came from Forbes (2013). 
Industry Consolidation 
If the proliferation of global defense firms and suppliers presents risks, so does the consolidation 
of the U.S. defense industrial base. A string of defense firm mergers in the 1990s resulted in 
significant industry consolidation. The number of major U.S.-based defense and aerospace 

























This consolidation (which included considerable vertical integration, with the primes absorbing 
many of the suppliers) also had an impact at the lower levels, with many of the remaining 
suppliers moving much of their business to the commercial sector. These suppliers could no 
longer rely on the DoD to provide the majority of their business. In many critical defense areas, 
the number of suppliers remaining—at either the prime contractor or lower-tier levels—is down 
to only one or two. The smaller network of trusted suppliers can lead to difficulties in acquiring 
parts, especially replacement parts that are no longer manufactured by the original provider. 
Often, the DoD must look to foreign or commercial suppliers with whom it has no prior 
relationship.  
In April 2013, the Pentagon acknowledged that it had leased a Chinese satellite to provide 
urgently needed communications capabilities for its Africa command. The DoD stated that the 
Chinese satellite provides “unique bandwidth and geographic requirements” that other satellites 
do not (Capaccio, 2013). China is Africa’s largest trading partner, and Chinese companies 
(Huawei and ZTE in particular) have invested significantly in the continent’s infrastructure; the 
construction of an advanced communications satellite is but one investment among many. From 
an economic standpoint, the arguments in favor of the U.S. leasing the Chinese satellite are clear: 
it provides superior performance that cannot easily be obtained from other providers, and it was 
readily available in a time of urgent need.  
Globalization of the defense industry is already well underway and largely irreversible. Indeed, 
virtually all U.S weapons systems manufactured today contain foreign parts. Yet objections to 
“buying foreign” are voiced repeatedly within American defense circles, wasting valuable time 
and resources. Congress, industry, and the public regularly scrutinize DoD decisions to buy or 
lease foreign parts or entire systems, collaborate on projects with oversees partners, or share 
technology with allies, regardless of the details. To be sure, there are risks associated with 
globalization, including the purchase of counterfeit parts, which is precisely why the United 
States must pursue a defense industrial policy that anticipates, rather than reacts to, the expansion 
of global trade and technological innovation.  
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III. Counterfeits: A Growing Problem 
The practice of counterfeiting is growing, but it is not new. Daniel Hamermesh (2013) pointed to 
a display of shrunken heads, once prepared by Amazon tribes for trophy or ritual purposes, that 
is featured at the Mutter Museum in Philadelphia. The display includes the following 
explanation: 
Westerners traveling to the territory in the late 19th century … were fascinated with the 
heads and offered the tribe money and guns in exchange … This led to an increase in 
warfare…both to get more heads to sell and because of the prevalence of guns. It also led 
to the creation of counterfeit heads … made from real human heads but not prepared by 
the tribe, and others [that] were made from monkey, goat, or other animal skin. 
(Hamermesh, 2013, p. 1) 
 
Similar schemes exist today. Some lower-tier subcontractors and suppliers for major defense 
companies will go as far as to manufacture or otherwise procure authentic parts, only to mix 
them with older and often cheaper parts of inferior quality and/or non-working parts. Needless to 
say, schemes of this sort make determining the provenance of counterfeit parts and components 
exceedingly difficult.  
Counterfeit Consumer Goods 
Counterfeiters strike when the costs are low and the rewards are high, hence their interest in 
industries such as fine wine and pharmaceuticals. It is relatively easy to remove and replace wine 
labels. And many people cannot distinguish between a $15 and $50 bottle of wine, let alone 
between a $300 and a $1,000 bottle of wine, the price range that many wine counterfeiters tend 
to deal in. It is not until they get careless that they are caught. In 2012, a California man was 
charged with trying to sell a wine bottle that he claimed was a 1929 Domaine Ponsot. However, 
Domaine Ponsot did not begin bottling until 1934. Similarly, pharmaceuticals are targeted by 
counterfeiters because the manufacturing costs are so low—reproducing the authentic-looking 
packaging is more expensive than making the fake drug. 
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But not all counterfeiters are looking for an immediate payoff. Counterfeiting takes many forms, 
with those responsible constantly devising new schemes. In October of 2012, for example, 
hundreds of crates of Heinz ketchup were discovered in an abandoned warehouse in Dover, New 
Jersey (Kim, 2012). Many of the bottles had exploded due to the heat. Authorities also found 
several empty bottles, labels, and equipment. Apparently, bottles of “Simply Heinz” ketchup—
whose retail value is higher than Heinz’s traditional ketchup—were being emptied and refilled 
with traditional Heinz. Though authorities have yet to conclude their investigation, it appears that 
counterfeiters were looking to pull one over on consumers. Though the ketchup never reached 
stores, the counterfeiters stood to make a 36-cent premium for each bottle of the not-so-premium 
ketchup sold. 
 
Figure 3. Global economic impact of counterfeit consumer goods  
Note. The information in this graph is from OECD (2011). 
 
 
The range of counterfeited consumer goods is wide, and it is growing (see Figure 3). The rise of 
e-commerce, extended international supply chains, stronger reliance on overseas manufacturing, 
and more recently, the global economic recession, have all contributed to the proliferation of 
counterfeit goods (“Knock Offs Catch On,” 2010). In addition to the many smaller goods, such 
as watches, purses, cigarettes, movies, and software, the consumer market has seen a marked 





Counterfeiting operations run the gamut, from swapping ketchup labels to the sophisticated 
reproduction of advanced electronics. Somewhere in the middle of this continuum resides the 
burgeoning practice of harvesting and, often, repurposing electronic waste or “e-waste” (e.g., 
discarded computers, office electronic equipment, entertainment device electronics, mobile 
phones, telephones, and refrigerators). Even the poorest of the poor can engage in this practice. 
In the slums of China, India, and Pakistan, peasants “cook” circuit boards over trash can fires in 
order to remove the metal chips, selling them to local counterfeiting operations (see Figure 4). A 
2008 article in Bloomberg describes the “garbage-strewn streets” of Guiyu, in Guangdong 
Province, China, as reeking of “burning plastic as workers in back rooms and open yards strip 
chips from old PC circuit boards” (Grow, Chi-Chu, Edwards, & Burnsed, 2008, p. 2). 
Once the chips are cleaned, refurbished, and relabeled, they are purchased by unscrupulous 
military subcontractors that go on to supply “military grade” microchips to many of America’s 
largest defense companies. These microchips have been found in American weapons systems. 
The threat of counterfeit parts continues to grow as counterfeiters have developed more 
sophisticated capabilities to replicate parts and gain access to scrap materials that were thought to 
have been destroyed (Belva, 2010).  
 
Figure 4. A woman in Taizhou, China, melts a circuit board to remove the metal chips (Basel Action Network, 2007) 
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Counterfeits may also take the form of functional knock-offs made in chip factories that pirate 
the designs of other chips. More commonly, counterfeiters apply fake markings to lower quality 
or less sophisticated chips in an effort to pass them off as more expensive chips (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. This chip was coated and remarked. The original logo is partially visible. (AERI, 2013) 
Counterfeit chips may show signs of having been manipulated. These signs include 
discoloration, dirt, or residues on the leads; non-uniform color; no exposed copper on the ends of 
leads; missing pins; excessive or uneven plating; and excessive solder on leads (SAE, 2013). 
Discrepant markings are also characteristic of counterfeit parts. For example, devices marked 
with the same date and/or lot code may exhibit varying country-of-origin stamps, body molds, 
and backside markings (SAE, 2013). Sometimes, previous marking may be visible on the 
device’s surface. Often, in an effort to remove markings, counterfeiters sand down the chip and 
then resurface it. However, counterfeiters may not always succeed in replicating the indentations 




Figure 6. A legitimate chip (top) and a non-working counterfeit chip (AERI, 2013) 
According to the National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA), which has led the way in 
establishing industry standards for counterfeit detection and prevention, there are several factors 
that have drawn counterfeiters to the electronic component market. These factors include the 
following (Oberhettinger, 2008): 
• Device obsolescence has caused an increase in the scarcity and price of critical 
components used in military and civil aerospace systems.  
• The flow of information through internet product search engines facilitates finding 
obsolete or hard-to-find devices, and obtaining delivery overnight or within a few days. 
But internet purchases may provide no traceability or complex part sourcing history, 
minimal warranties, and no certainty of replacements or refunds.  
• With the increasing sophistication and complexity of component technology, it may be 
more difficult to detect fakes. Testing of incoming items has decreased over the years, 
resulting in a reliance on the suppliers’ Certificate of Compliance as proof of authenticity 
and compliance.  
• Unauthorized gray market channels for legitimate products can facilitate distribution by 
counterfeiters. Gray market distributors cannot determine whether a high volume influx 
of a product is a counterfeit or a legitimate OCM product that has been redirected from 
the source.  
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• Subcontract assemblers and manufacturers may not report suspect devices in order to 
protect their reputation for quality. 
Villasenor (2013) pointed out that today’s computer chips have become so complex that it is 
virtually impossible for a single individual to understand every element of its design. 
Consequently, quality assurance through automated testing is next to impossible as “it would 
take many years to exhaustively test everything that a modern large chip can do” (Villasenor, 
2013, p. 2). Accordingly, testing is performed on a statistical basis using only a small fraction of 
possible inputs that are observed and used to infer proper functionality for inputs not specifically 
tested. Clearly, having to rely on inference rather than evidence of functionality is problematic. 
In 2005, The Defense Science Board (DSB) stated that “trust cannot be added to integrated 
circuits after fabrication; electrical testing and reverse engineering cannot be relied upon to 
detect undesired alterations in military circuits” (p. 3). 
Damaged, recycled, and inferior electronic chips may show signs of “undesired alteration,” 
which may or may not lead a weapons system to improperly function. However, there is 
greater—and growing—concern that some electronic chips are intentionally altered during the 
design process. In his paper, “Compromised by Design? Securing the Defense Electronics 
Supply Chain,” Villasenor (2013) wrote that “as chips have gotten more complex … the 
opportunities to insert malicious functionality have increased” (p. 1). Moreover, Villasenor 
(2013) asserts that the “attacker” need not have advance knowledge of the chip’s destination: 
“An attacker could afford to cast a wide net, knowing that only a tiny fraction of corrupted chips 
would end up in systems of interest” (p. 9). In other words, the attacker could design a small 
“back door” in every system, the majority of which would never be exploited.  
Reporting Counterfeits 
Government agencies as well as private companies are encouraged to report counterfeits using 
several databases. The first is the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP). The 
GIDEP serves as a data repository for the collection and sharing information on nonconforming 
parts and materials (Livingston, 2010). This web-based database allows government and industry 
participants to share information on deficient parts, including counterfeits.  
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A GIDEP user can submit information on a suspected counterfeit part, and GIDEP policy allows 
for up to 15 days for the supplier to respond before posting this information to the database. To 
ensure that reports are objective and fact based, GIDEP policy requires submitters to notify 
suppliers of their intention to report. All parties involved are allowed to present their side of the 
story (Belva, 2010). 
Although GIDEP is the predominant counterfeit reporting mechanism in place for government 
and its suppliers, it is not universally utilized. A study by the Aerospace Industries Association 
[AIA] of America (2012) found several reasons why some suppliers do not use the system, 
including “legal or liability issues” (e.g., exposure to third-party lawsuits) that encumber 
reporting and organizations’ business processes that do not “support reporting non-conforming 
material findings outside of the organization” (AIA, 2011, p. 13). 
 
The GIDEP issued an interim policy change regarding “Reporting Suspect Counterfeit Parts and 
Materials” in September 2010 to “facilitate and encourage the reporting of suspect counterfeits 
until such time as federal policy and an appropriate supporting procedure can be determined and 
implemented” (AIA, 2011, p. 13). Under the current GIDEP policy, members are asked to 
identify the supplier of the part or material when reporting a suspect counterfeit in the database 
(AIA, 2011). 
  
However, GIDEP members are sometimes “hesitant or not permitted to identify the supplier due 
to potential legal issues or other concerns” (p. 13). If the “true” manufacturer or supplier is not 
identified when submitting a report, “current GIDEP policy limits the use … to only a Problem 
Advisory” and prevents the “reporter from alerting the community via a Safe-Alert or Alert when 
the severity or likelihood of the failure is known” (AIA, 2011, p. 13). 
 
The DoD also uses the Joint Deficiency Reporting System (JDRS), a cross-service, web-enabled, 
automated tracking system designed to initiate, process, and track deficiency reports, in addition 
to the Product Data Reporting and Evaluation Program (PDREP) for reporting and disposal of 
deficient parts. JDRS and PDREP do not have a specific field in which to report counterfeit 
parts. Some DoD officials stated that they report suspect counterfeits to internal fraud teams; 
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others indicated that they would contact local law enforcement or the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in similar cases.  
 
Additionally, agencies within the DoD have taken specific actions to block the flow of 
counterfeit products. For example, the DLA’s Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC) 
implemented a Qualified Suppliers List of Distributors (QSLD) program (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2010). 
 
The purpose of the QSLD program is to establish and maintain a list of pre-qualified sources for 
certain electronic components that are purchased and managed by DLA Land and Maritime. 
QSLD products are provided by suppliers that combine accepted commercial practices, quality 
assurance procedures that are consistent with industry and international quality standards, and 
tailored when necessary to product-unique requirements that can take the place of provisions 
traditionally stated in DLA Land and Maritime solicitations (DLA, 2012).  
This approach is designed to reduce the need for testing, engineering reviews, and other activities 
that can delay acquisitions and increase acquisition costs. The QSLD program also enables the 
DSCC to use automated electronic parts purchasing, but with a modification from past practice. 
All purchases made through the QSLD system are subject to a final manual review prior to 
execution. About 50% of parts would be acquired through the system, enabling the DSCC to 
reassign some personnel to other duties (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010).  
 
Counterfeits in Department of Defense Systems 
The same global forces responsible for the increase in consumer counterfeits have also impacted 
the aeronautics and defense industries. Across the DoD, counterfeits of all types—from 
electronic equipment to metal fasteners—have been found. As a direct consequence, the lives of 
military men and women are at stake. Incredibly, the number of counterfeit parts in electronic 
military systems more than doubled between 2005 and 2008, rising from 3,868 incidents to 9,356 
incidents (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010).  
Thus far, the impact of counterfeit parts in the supply chain has been minimal in this regard. 
According to Pentagon Press Secretary George Little, “[the DoD] is unaware to date of any loss 
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of life or catastrophic mission failure that has occurred because of counterfeit parts” (Ferran, 
2012, p. 1). But given the massive growth if counterfeit parts in the supply chain, it may only be 
a matter of time. Accordingly, the DoD has remained resolute in its approach. Little has also 
stated, “We will not stop until we strengthen our efforts to identify, prevent and detect these 
smaller pieces of equipment from entering our supply chain” (p. 1). 
In a 2010 report, the U.S. Department of Commerce defined a counterfeit as a part that is not 
genuine because it • is an unauthorized copy; • does not conform to original component manufacturers (OCMs) design, model, and/or 
performance standards; • is not produced by the OCM or is produced by unauthorized contractors; • is an off-specification, defective, or used OCM product sold as new or working; or • has incorrect or false markings and/or documentation. 
All branches of the services are affected by the threat of counterfeit parts. The following 
examples illustrate cases in which counterfeit parts have infiltrated the services’ supply chains 
(GAO, 2010):  
Army—Seatbelt clasps: Seatbelt parts were made from a grade of aluminum that was inferior to 
that specified in DoD’s requirements. The parts were found to be deficient when the seatbelts 
were accidentally dropped and they broke.  
Navy—Routers: The Navy, as well as other DoD and government agencies, purchased 
counterfeit network components—including routers—that had high failure rates and the potential 
to shut down entire networks. A two-year FBI criminal investigation led to 10 convictions and 
$1.7 million in restitution.  
Air Force—Microprocessor: The Air Force needed microprocessors that were no longer 
produced by the original manufacturer for its F-15 flight-control computer. These 
microprocessors were procured from a broker, and F-15 technicians noticed additional markings 
on the microprocessor and character spacing inconsistent with the original part. A total of four 
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counterfeit microprocessors were found and, as a result, were not installed on the F-15s’ 
operational flight control computers.  
Defense Logistics Agency—Packaging and small parts: During a two-year period, a supplier 
and three co-conspirators packaged hundreds of commercial items from hardware and consumer 
electronics stores and labeled them as military-grade items. For example, a supplier labeled the 
package containing a circuit from a personal computer as a $7,000 circuit for a missile guidance 
system. The suppliers avoided detection by labeling packages to appear authentic, even though 
they contained the wrong part. The supplier received $3 million from contracts totaling $8 
million before fleeing the country.  
In June 2007, the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS’s) Office of Technology Evaluation 
(OTE) conducted a defense industrial base assessment of counterfeit electronics. OTE surveyed 
five segments of the supply chain including the original component manufacturers (OCMs), 
distributors and brokers, circuit board assemblers, prime contractors and subcontractors, and 
DoD agencies. The report came to the following conclusions: 
OTE data revealed that 39 percent of companies and organizations participating in the 
survey encountered counterfeit electronics during the four-year period. Moreover, 
information collected highlighted an increasing number of counterfeit incidents being 
detected, rising from 3,868 incidents in 2005 to 9,356 incidents in 2008. The rise of 
counterfeit parts in the supply chain is exacerbated by demonstrated weaknesses in 
inventory management, procurement procedures, recordkeeping, reporting practices, 
inspection and testing protocols, and communication within and across all industry and 
government organizations. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010, p. i) 
The study revealed several key reasons why counterfeits enter the DoD supply chain. Figure 7 




Greater reliance by brokers on gray market parts  42% 
Greater reliance by independent distributors on gray market parts  37% 
Less stringent inventory management by parts brokers  36% 
Less stringent inventory management by independent distributors 28% 
Insufficient buying procedures 23% 
Insufficient chain of accountability 27% 
Purchase of excess inventory on the open market 23% 
Inadequate part purchase planning by OEMs 23% 
Inadequate part purchase planning by contract manufacturers 23% 
Greater reliance on contract manufacturers for procurement 23% 
 
Figure 7. Top 10 reasons for counterfeits entering the supply chain (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010) 
 
As Figure 7 demonstrates, the DoD’s increasing reliance on so-called gray market parts explains, 
in large part, the growing supply of counterfeits. The booming gray market in military-grade 
electronics in particular emerged for a number of reasons, including the DoD’s persistent need 
for aging equipment, and, more recently, declining budgets—smaller brokers settle for smaller 
profit margins. In addition, federal law has encouraged the DoD to favor smaller, disadvantaged, 
suppliers (e.g., minority or veteran owned; Grow et al., 2008), which may rely on less secure 
practices. Today, the DoD procures millions of parts through its logistics support providers. As 
they draw from a large network of suppliers in an increasingly global supply chain, there can be 
limited visibility into these sources. These sources include the original component 




Type of Source Description 
Original component 
manufacturer (OCM) 
Organization that designs, or engineers, a part and is pursuing or has 
obtained the intellectual property rights to that part. 
Franchised distributor Distributor with which OCM has a contractual agreement to buy, stock, 
repackage, sell, and distribute its product lines. 
Independent distributor Distributor that purchases new parts with the intention to sell and 
redistribute them back into the market, and which does not have 
contractual agreements with OCM. 
Broker/ broker distributor In the independent distribution market, brokers are professionally referred 
to as independent distributors. A broker distributor is a type of 
independent distributor that works in a just-in-time environment by 
searching the industry and locating parts for customers. 
Aftermarket manufacturer Manufacturer that either (1) produces and sells replacement parts 
authorized by the OCM, or (2) produces parts through emulation, reverse-
engineering, or redesign that match OCM specifications and satisfy 
customer needs without violating OCM intellectual property rights, 
patents, or copyrights. 
 
Figure 8. Types of DoD suppliers of parts and components (Belva, 2010) 
 
As mentioned, aging systems often rely on obsolete parts and components. As DoD weapons 
systems age, products required to support it may no longer be available from the original 
manufacturers or through franchised or authorized suppliers. Moreover, DoD logistics offices in 
charge of solving obsolescence problems are challenged by limited budgets and time constraints. 
According to a report by the Department of Commerce (2010), “it is typically less expensive to 
find part substitutions and aftermarket manufacturing [i.e. “built-to-print” shops] for needed 
electronic parts than reengineering and redesigning parts and components. In addition, 
obsolescence mitigation strategies also take a long time to implement” (p. 1). As a result, 
procurement agents must purchase parts from unknown sources; this, of course, heightens the 
risk of acquiring counterfeit parts.  
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Figure 9. Aging systems are associated with an increased risk of acquiring counterfeit parts (Peters, 2012) 
It is especially challenging to acquire legitimate semiconductors given this industry’s relatively 
quick innovation cycles. Hamermesh (2013) described the counterfeit shrunken heads as a case 
of “induced supply push” (p. 1). Because there was unmet demand for shrunken heads, new 
sellers entered the market selling replicas. In the case of semiconductors, many active military 
systems were built using now-obsolete semiconductors, the production of which was halted 
years, even decades, ago by the original manufacturer. This creates a business opportunity for 
vendors to sell “new old stock,” which, in turn, creates traction for the manufacture of 
semiconductors made from recycled, broken, fake, or otherwise inauthentic parts. Figure 9 
illustrates the association between aging systems (i.e., “legacy” systems) and the risk to the DoD 




IV. Counterfeit Detection and Prevention 
Counterfeiting in any industry threatens innovation by reducing the value of intellectual 
property. However, counterfeit wines and ketchup do not pose the same risks as counterfeit 
aerospace components or pharmaceuticals, for obvious reasons. As a result, these two industries 
have designed rigorous and effective detection and prevention processes in order to mitigate risk. 
We examine these processes in the sections that follow. 
Aerospace 
In 2007, SAE International chartered a committee to develop standards for counterfeit detection 
and prevention for the aerospace industry. SAE is a U.S.-based, globally active professional 
association and standards organization for engineering professionals. The organization 
coordinates the development of technical standards based on best practices identified and 
described by SAE committees. The committee formed with representatives from the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, the DoD, NASA, original component manufacturers, contract 
assembly manufacturers, distributors, and industry suppliers and associations. This committee 
worked to develop a counterfeit electronic parts control plan known as SAE International 
AS5553 (“Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition”), 
which it formally released in April 2009.  
In 2009, the committee developed a document that standardized requirements, practices, and 
methods related to counterfeit parts risk mitigation. The committee also developed a counterfeit 
electronic parts control plan that includes processes to specifically address counterfeit part risk 
mitigation methods in areas including electronic design and parts management, supplier 
management, procurement, part verification, material control, and response strategies when 
suspect or confirmed counterfeit parts are discovered (Johnson, 2012b)). The plan, SAE 
International Standard AS5553, was entitled “Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, 
Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition.” SAE (2013) described the new standard as follows: 
 The resulting product presents solutions in addressing counterfeit electronic parts  issues 
 across a large cross section of the electronics industry by requiring those who adopt it to 
 develop and implement a counterfeit electronic parts control plan. The control plan 
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 includes processes to specifically address counterfeit part risk mitigation methods in 
 electronic design and parts management, supplier management, procurement, part 
 verification, material control, and response strategies when suspect or confirmed 
 counterfeit parts are discovered. (p. 2) 
 
The standard requires, notably, that companies complete a risk assessment and provide for 
external auditing, ongoing testing and inspection, supply chain traceability, and penalties 
associated with fraud (SAE, 2013). The standard is intended to inform individualized 
requirements that are commensurate with program risk and are intended to be “flowed down” 
through the supply chain by all organizations that procure electronic parts. The requirements are 
to be enforced via contract specifications (SAE, 2013). 
 
NASA was the first government agency to adopt SAE International AS5553 on November 3, 
2008, before the official release of the plan (NASA, 2013)). The DoD followed suit in August 
2009, requiring that the standard be used for internal purchasing purposes; however, the DoD 
does not require that its contractors adhere to this specific standard.  
 
Identification, removal, and prevention of counterfeit electronics in NASA’s supply chain is 
critical to maintaining the safety of personnel and the integrity of components used in satellites, 
rockets, communications systems, and computers. As is the case with DoD, counterfeit parts can 
threaten missions and, more importantly, lives. For this reason, NASA goes to exhausting 
lengths to ensure component quality and integrity.  
 
To implement the policy, NASA focuses on educating and training its people and its suppliers. 
The agency provides awareness briefings, reports all ERAI counterfeit parts alerts to all NASA 
organizations, and hosts bi-annual quality leadership forums and annual supplier quality 
conferences. Training includes (1) a review of the Independent Distributors of Electronics 
Association (IDEA) Inspection Standard 1010A to all NASA centers and prime contractors; (2) a 
course in Counterfeit Parts Avoidance for inspectors, operators, auditors, and suppliers; and (3) 




One example of NASA’s efforts to eradicate quality issues and preempt counterfeit risk is the 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) supplier assessment program. The GSFC selects each 
prime contract supplier for an assessment every two years. Lower tier supplier assessment 
considerations include high-risk or critical suppliers, common supplier for multiple mission 
projects, new suppliers, supplier issues or concerns elevated to senior management, or a project 
office request. The assessment includes a review of procedures and processes, sampling of 
documents or records, interviews of management and personnel, and direct observation.  
 
From this review, the assessment team generates a report that includes corrective and preventive 
actions. Then, the report is distributed to the supplier, NASA GSFC offices, and other NASA 
centers or agencies (Root, 2011). 
 
During execution of the corrective and preventive action plan, the NASA team performs a root-
cause analysis and a cost-benefit analysis of corrective actions. The team also determines timing 
and assesses short- and long-term containment actions. Finally, the team works with the facility 
to implement corrective and preventive actions based on priority, impact, and risk (Brunello & 
Robinson, 2011). As a result of supplier assessments at GSFC, the team addresses issues such as 
obsolete procedures referenced, expired materials, logs not correct or not signed/dated, 
calibration supplier contract inadequate, and mishap reporting not accurate (Sivcovich, 2012). 
 
NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center relies on five testing phases and inspections in order to 
ensure against counterfeits (Johnson, 2012b). Contractors are required to document the parts that 
they use, and parts are inspected and tested before flight. Contractors then receive a weighted 
risk score ranging from one to 100. A score of 52 qualifies a contractor to do business with 
NASA (Johnson, 2012b).  
 
NASA has mandated (1) supply chain traceability to the OCM or aftermarket manufacturer that 
identifies the name and location of all of the supply chain intermediaries from the part 
manufacturer to the direct source of the product for the seller, and (2) flow down of applicable 




The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2010 
emphasized the improvement of NASA’s efforts against counterfeits (Zulueta, 2011). NASA’s 
success in reducing counterfeit electronics by adopting SAE International AS5553 catalyzed the 
formation of a new multi-agency working group. In 2010, 14 U.S. government agencies, 
including Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), DoD, NASA, Department of Energy (DoE), and General Services 
Administration (GSA), formed the USG Inter-Agency Anti-Counterfeiting Working Group to 
identify areas of common interest and compare progress and best practices to ultimately 
eliminate counterfeits in their supply chains and develop a consistent and effective government-
wide approach to reducing the U.S. government’s vulnerability to counterfeit products 
(Executive Office of the President of the United States , 2011).  
 
NASA has begun to focus on the education of its suppliers through sharing current policy and 
requirements with suppliers, sending out new electronic component surveys to assess risk level, 
and narrowing down the specifics of what qualifies as a “trusted supplier” (Foster, 2012).  
 
Pharmaceuticals  
The World Health Organization (WHO; 2013) defines a counterfeit pharmaceutical product as  
 
a counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with 
respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic 
products, and counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredients or 
with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active 
ingredients or with fake packaging.  
 
In poor countries that lack the necessary safety precautions, or where government inspectors can 
be easily bribed, counterfeit drugs are ubiquitous. In Nigeria, for example, over 60% of 
antimalarial drugs are fakes. The majority (over 70%) of these often useless (and sometimes 
even deadly) drugs originate from India and China (WHO, 2011). Luckily, counterfeit drugs are 
rare in the United States, thanks to the relatively high level of safety assuredness for U.S. 
pharmaceuticals (Lechleiter, 2012). However, serious incidents have occurred. 
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Today, pharmaceutical companies take additional precautions to prevent this type of incident. 
Anti-counterfeit technologies in the pharmaceutical industry fall into three major categories: (1) 
tamper-evident or tamper-resistant packing, (2) product authentication, and (3) track and trace 
technology.  
Tamper-evident and tamper-resistant packaging was one of the first forms of anti-counterfeit 
technologies. In the fall of 1982, Johnson & Johnson was forced to respond when seven patients 
died after taking cyanide-laced Tylenol in the Chicago area. The company conducted a 
voluntary, nation-wide recall and provided free replacements for all of its consumers. When the 
company re-released the product, Tylenol was available only in new tamper-proof containers.  
 
Tamper-evident packaging can include plastic seals outside lids and seals between lids and 
containers. Although the use of tamper evident closures does not make a product tamper-proof, it 
can give consumers peace of mind that the products they are buying have not been altered after 
leaving the manufacturer. Recently, The U.S.-Member Body for the IEC Quality Assessment 
System for Electronic Components discussed the potential use of tamper-evident packaging for 
sensitive electronic parts and components, noting that it might provide “a level of confidence 
when dealing with returns” and thus has the potential for lowering handling costs (Salot, 2011). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry also uses product authentication measures, which rely on overt, 
covert, and forensic features to prevent counterfeit production. Holograms and color shift inks 
are examples of overt features, while digital watermarks and invisible printing are examples of 




Figure 10. Comparison of pharmaceutical product authentication characteristics 
 
Newer technologies include the Sproxil authentication system and SecureLight+. The Sproxil 
authentication system has a scratch-off label with a unique code. Consumers can send a free text 
message with the code to Sproxil, and the system responds with another free text informing the 
consumer whether the product is genuine. This system already has been implemented in Nigeria. 
SecureLight+ instantly changes color under both compact fluorescent light (CFL) and LED light 
sources, allowing the confirmation of authenticity. SecureLight+ has an additional safeguard that 
contains an up-converting infrared feature and a customizable digital signature that can be read 
only with a specifically tuned handheld device (see Figure 11). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry also relies on track-and-trace technologies, which allow companies 
to determine the current and past locations of items. Radio-frequency identification and 
barcodes are two common technology methods used to provide traceability. Within the 
pharmaceutical industry, “e-pedigree” numbers or codes track all the way through the supply 
chain, allowing companies to confirm that a product is authentic from the time it leaves the 
manufacturing site to the time it hits the shelves.  
 
However, track and trace technologies are not the panacea that many manufacturers claim. For 
instance, RFID use comes with risks, such as damage to biotechnology products (due to 
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electromagnetic waves). Moreover, the significant costs associated with implementation can 
prove problematic. According to Barlas (2008), “it is the pharmacies, more than the 
manufacturers or the wholesalers, that have the more complex technical task and that face the 
higher cost hit, based on percentage of revenues” (p. 1). He went on to state that  
 
the big revenue hit would come from the need to purchase various types of bar code 
readers, radio frequency identification (RFID) chip readers, and software and database 
upgrades so that pharmacies will be able to authenticate each individual package from the 
bar code or the RFID chip (or both) attached to each package label. (Barlas, 2008, p. 1)  
 
Moreover, there is no single, inter-operative e-Pedigree technology upon which all parties rely, 
and e-Pedigree laws are in a constant state of flux. For these reasons, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has yet to mandate the use of a universal track-and-trace system. 
 
 
Figure 11. Patented anti-counterfeit technologies  
 
The DoD faces similar challenges. In November 2012, the DoD began using plant DNA to mark 
microcircuits. SigNature DNA security measures are manufactured by Applied DNA Sciences in 
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Stony Brook, New York (Winter, 2013). Each item bears an individual plant’s DNA sequence 
that has been altered slightly from its natural state, preventing accidental marking or confusion 
with naturally occurring plant DNA (Winter 2013). This altered DNA can be mixed with inks or 
infused into the actual materials like silicon, plastics, and wires (Freedberg, 2012).  
But DNA tagging does not eliminate the problem of currently circulating counterfeit parts in 
secondary markets. Moreover, because the DoD is not the largest buyer of microelectronics, the 
private sector market must buy in to DNA tagging in order for manufacturers to include this anti-
counterfeit measure on all products. 
The DoD has not adopted the aerospace standard, nor has it developed its own. And given the 
difficulty in establishing uniform track and trace processes as well as uncertaintly regarding the 
value of tamper-evident packaging and other technologies, the DoD has come to rely primarily 
on contractor reporting, the development of trusted networks of suppliers, and, to a lesser extent, 
the testing of parts and components in order to reduce the incidence of counterfeiting. The DoD’s 





V. Addressing Counterfeits in Defense Systems 
In 2012, the Committee on Armed Services released its Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts 
in the Department of Defense Supply Chain. The inquiry was launched partially in response to a 
2010 GAO report that concluded that the  
 
DoD is limited in its ability to determine the extent to which counterfeit parts exist in its 
supply chain because it does not have a department-wide definition of the term 
counterfeit and a consistent means to identify instances of suspected counterfeit parts. 
(p. 21) 
 
The extensive report issued by the committee uncovered overwhelming evidence of large 
numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems. It also revealed 
failures by contractors and the military services and DoD agencies to report the occurrence of 
counterfeits. According to the report, the investigation “exposed a defense supply chain that 
relies on hundreds of unvetted independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our 
most sensitive defense systems” (Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 1). Between 2009 and 
2010, the investigation uncovered 1,800 cases of suspect counterfeit electronic parts, with the 
total number of individual suspect parts exceeding more than a million. Suspect counterfeit parts 
were discovered in critical weapons systems, including Navy helicopters and Air Force cargo 
jets. The committee came to the following conclusions: 
 Conclusion 1: China is the dominant source country for counterfeit electronic parts that 
 are infiltrating the defense supply chain.  
 Conclusion 2: The Chinese government has failed to take steps to stop counterfeiting 
 operations that are carried out openly in that country.  
 Conclusion 3: The DoD lacks knowledge of the scope and impact of counterfeit parts on 
critical defense systems. 
 Conclusion 4: The use of counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems can compromise 
 performance and reliability, risk national security, and endanger the safety of military 
 personnel.  
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 Conclusion 5: Permitting contractors to recover costs incurred as a result of their own 
 failure to detect counterfeit electronic parts does not encourage the adoption of aggressive 
 counterfeit avoidance and detection programs. 
 Conclusion 6: The defense industry’s reliance on unvetted independent distributors to 
 supply electronic parts for critical military applications results in unacceptable risks to 
 national security and the safety of U.S. military personnel.  
 Conclusion 7: Weaknesses in the testing regime for electronic parts create vulnerabilities 
 that are exploited by counterfeiters.  
 Conclusion 8: The defense industry routinely failed to report cases of suspect counterfeit 
 parts, putting the integrity of the defense supply chain at risk. 
 
These conclusions informed new legislation that was written into Section 818 of the 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This section summarizes Section 818, its 
implementation, and some of the new challenges that it has created. 
Section 818 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 
On a legislative front, Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, enacted in 
December 2011, contains new mandates for the DoD to mitigate the threat of counterfeit 
electronic parts. Of most note, Section 818 stipulates that contractors “who supply electronic 
parts or products … are responsible for detecting and avoiding the use or inclusion of counterfeit 
electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts.” Additionally, the new law asserts that 
“the cost of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts and the cost of 
rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts are 
not allowable costs under Department contracts.” 
 
Also significant, the law stipulates that the DoD and all DoD contractors and subcontractors 
must “whenever possible” obtain electronic parts from OEMs or their authorized dealers or from 




Finally, the law also requires contractors and subcontractors to report counterfeit parts using 
GIDEP or other designated counterfeit reporting system. 
 
In addition to these new regulations, Section 818 directs the DoD to take action on a number of 
related issues, following a period of assessment by the secretary of defense, to be carried out 
within 180 days of the enactment of the NDAA. These “actions after assessment” included the 
following: 
 
 1. Establish department-wide definitions of the terms counterfeit electronic part and 
 suspect counterfeit electronic part, which definitions shall include previously used 
 parts represented as new. 
 2. Issue or revise guidance applicable to department components engaged in the purchase 
 of electronic parts to implement a risk-based approach to minimize the impact of 
 counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts on the department, 
 which guidance shall address requirements for training personnel, making sourcing 
 decisions, ensuring traceability of parts, inspecting and testing parts, reporting and 
 quarantining counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts, and 
 taking corrective actions (including actions to recover costs as described in subsection 
 (c)(2)). 
 3. Issue or revise guidance applicable to the department on remedial actions to be taken 
 in the case of a supplier who has repeatedly failed to detect and avoid counterfeit 
 electronic parts or otherwise failed to exercise due diligence in the detection and 
 avoidance of such parts, including consideration of whether to suspend or debar a 
 supplier until such time as the supplier has effectively addressed the issues that led to 
 such failures. 
 4. Establish processes for ensuring that department personnel who become aware of, or 
 have reason to suspect, that any end item, component, part, or material contained in 
 supplies purchased by or for the department contains counterfeit electronic parts or 
 suspect counterfeit electronic parts provide a report in writing within 60 days to 
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 appropriate government authorities and to the Government-Industry Data Exchange 
 Program (or a similar program designated by the secretary). 
 5. Establish a process for analyzing, assessing, and acting on reports of counterfeit 
 electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts. 
March 2012 Memorandum 
Initial implementation of the DoD’s actions following their assessment began in March of 2012. 
A memorandum was issued by the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and 
logistics (USD[AT&L]) to the secretaries of the military departments and directors of the 
defense agencies. The actions contained in the memo primarily addressed subparagraph 2, above 
(i.e., the implementation of the risk-based approach to counterfeit detection and prevention). The 
memorandum stipulated the following: 
1. Program managers (PMs) must ensure that they are notified by the contractors and 
suppliers—including those below the prime contractor level—when critical items are not 
obtained from the original equipment manufacturer, original component manufacturer, or 
an authorized distributor.  
2. PMs must evaluate counterfeit risk and implement countermeasures for mission critical 
components, which are outlined in a July 2011 DoD memorandum entitled “Document 
Streamlining-Program Protection Plan (PPP).” The PPP should address counterfeit 
prevention, including what measures will be in place and how the program will mitigate 
the risk of the insertion of counterfeit parts during operations and maintenance [see 
Figure 12].  
3. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause 252.246-7003, 
“Notification of Potential Safety Issues,” must be included in solicitations and contracts 
for (1) repairable/consumable parts for critical safety items; (2) systems and subsystems, 
assemblies, and subassemblies integral to a system; or (3) repair, maintenance, logistics 
support, or overhaul services for systems and subsystems, assemblies, subassemblies, and 
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Assessing	  Vulnerability	  of	  Critical	  Components	  
The questions below are examples of the kinds of factors that should be considered in evaluating the potential 
vulnerability of a critical component prior to acquisition. 
 
Where and under what conditions was the system designed?  
• Who made significant system-wide design decisions?  
• Who has had access to design information?  
• How are requirements and specifications for critical components communicated to suppliers?  
• How much do suppliers know about how critical their products are to the overall system?  
 
Where and under what conditions were critical components developed?  
• For custom components, who made significant design decisions?  
• Who has had access to design information?  
• Where are critical components fabricated or manufactured?  
• Who has had access to fabrication or manufacturing processes?  
• What testing of critical components has been conducted? How and where?  
• How are critical components shipped?  
• How has custody of critical components been managed?  
 
How and where are components assembled and integrated into completed systems?  
• What final system testing is conducted?  
 
In addition to the above questions, it is useful to assign a criticality level to the overall project. These levels 
may include: 
Level I: Total mission failure 
Level II: Significant/unacceptable degradation 
Level III: Partial/acceptable degradation 
Level IV: Negligible 
 
parts integral to a system. This DFARS clause establishes the actions to be taken 
concerning nonconformance and deficiencies that could result in a critical safety impact.  
4. The GIDEP is designated as the central reporting repository for the DoD for suspected 
and confirmed counterfeit parts. Contractors, subcontractors, and DoD activities are to 
report counterfeit parts using the GIDEP’s Product Quality Deficiency Reporting process. 
The counterfeit reports are provided to all GIDEP members and are maintained in an on-
line searchable database.  
 





Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
The 2012 NDAA directed the DoD to establish specific requirements for contractor processes to 
avoid the inclusion of counterfeit parts (including testing, inspection, training, and so forth). It 
also directed the DoD to refine the definition of counterfeit parts. The DoD is proposing to 
amend the DFARS in order to meet these requirements. Final action is expected in early 2014.  
 
This supplement was scheduled to be released for comment by September of 2012 but was 
delayed by more than seven months. Contractors eagerly awaited the release of the new 
guidance, believing that the issuance of new processes and procedures, if diligently followed, 
might limit their liability with regard to the cost of counterfeit remediation. However, the new 
guidance did not include any detailed procedures. Contractors were disappointed to learn that, 
according to the guidance, firms had to devise their own “acceptable counterfeit electronic parts 
avoidance and detection systems.” The DFARS required these systems to include the following 
elements: 
• the training of personnel; 
• the inspection and testing of electronic parts, including criteria for acceptance and 
rejection, and processes to abolish counterfeit parts proliferation; 
• mechanisms to enable traceability of parts to suppliers; 
• the use and qualification of trusted suppliers; 
• the reporting of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts; 
• the quarantining of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic 
parts; 
• methodologies to identify suspect counterfeit parts and to rapidly determine whether a 
suspect counterfeit part is, in fact, counterfeit; 
• the design, operation, and maintenance of systems to detect and avoid counterfeit 
electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts; and 
• the flow down of counterfeit avoidance and detection requirements to subcontractor. 
 
One might recall that these elements constitute little more than a reiteration of the programmatic 
requirements described in the 2012 NDAA under “actions following assessment.” However, it is 
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unclear if any assessment was actually performed. Clearly, insofar as this guidance prescribes 
specific processes and procedures, it is wholly inadequate, especially considering that liability 
was to rest entirely with the contractor. The questions “How?” and “To what extent?” can be 
applied to each of the above elements. In an article entitled “DoD Counterfeit Parts Rule: So 
Little After So Long,” Robert Metzger (2013) wrote that the new guidance “fails to inform 
contractors of how they can minimize counterfeit risk” (p. 1). Livingston (2013) asserted that 
elements from SAE Aerospace Standard AS5553 (described in Part IV) could have been used to 
inform requirements and define implementation details. Similarly, the DoD could have relied on 
the March 2012 memorandum (described in the previous section) to inform the policies and 
procedures of an appropriate avoidance and detection system. 
 
In addition, the new guidance failed to adequately refine the definition of trusted supplier (recall 
that in the event that a contractor is unable to purchase a part or component from the original 
source [OEM or OCM], the contractor must acquire it from a “trusted supplier,” according to the 
2012 NDAA). Yet the guidance offered no instruction with regard to vetting and qualifying such 
a supplier and makes no mention of the role that the DoD, or other government customer, would 
play (if any) with regard to source approval. Again, given that liability rested solely with the 
contractor, this shortcoming in the DFARS was perceived as unfair by many within the 
contractor community. 
 
Henry Livingston (2013), technical director at BAE Systems, asserted that before the DoD 
proceeds with its implementation of the DFARS guidance, it should  
• define the elements of a contractor’s counterfeit electronic parts avoidance and detection 
system, including the central tenets of counterfeit electronic part prevention 
recommended by industry subject matter experts; 
• describe explicit criteria for the DoD’s approval; and 
• prepare and publish for public comment “audit guidance” associated with the assessment 




Critics of the DFARS might suggest that by failing to define specific criteria for system 
adequacy, the DoD could assert that a contractor who unknowingly procured counterfeits had 
failed to implement—in adequate fashion—counterfeit detection and prevention measures, even 
if the contractor’s anti-counterfeit system adhered to the basic elements listed above.  
 
This approach is not consistent with the DoD’s internal practices. Section 818 directs the DoD to 
implement a risk-based approach in an effort to prevent the inclusion of counterfeit parts. 
Metzger (2013) noted that by describing an approach as “risk-based,” the DoD has tacitly 
acknowledged that “it is impossible to eliminate all risk of counterfeit in every system that the 
DoD buys or supports” (p. 3). Thus, Metzger (2013), Livingston (2013), and others concluded 
that contractor liability should be limited to some extent based on the “best efforts” of 
contractors to avoid the inclusion of counterfeit parts.  
 
Yet, based on Section 818, contractors were liable not only for the cost of replacing a counterfeit 
part, but also for complete remediation up to and including the disassembly and rebuilding of 
affected systems. In the case of highly complex weapons systems, these costs could be 
considerable. And in today’s globalized defense industry, it is perhaps unfair to place the burden 
of total remediation on the contractors who design and manufacture America’s weapons systems. 
Metzger (2013) asserted that  
 
DoD contractors have some influence over counterfeit prevention risk, to be sure, but 
they did not create that risk and they do not have absolute authority over requirements or 
sources, much less the time or funds to insist upon parts with perfect provenance or 
pedigree. (p. 3)  
 
Indeed, it appears that this zero-tolerance policy with regard to counterfeit parts was misguided. 
Contractor liability should be limited, provided that rigorous detection and prevention regimes 
are in place. However, a one-size-fits-all regime is also inappropriate. Depending on the nature 
of the program, the implementation of a costly prevention policy may be less of a priority. As 
mentioned, counterfeits—from simple commodities, circuit boards, and semi-conductors to 
advanced electronics—can endanger lives. But they may also prove benign. The DoD already 
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categorizes parts and components that are essential to weapons system performance or operation, 
or the safety of operating personnel, as “critical application items.” Extending the risk-based 
approach to contractors, as opposed to implementing a prescriptive regime, allows the DoD to 
balance cost with risk. With this in mind, one might view the DoD’s failure to establish universal 
criteria for regime adequacy in a more favorable light. 
 
Recall that the DFARS also sought to refine the definition of counterfeit part. Here again, the 
DFARS contains some problematic language. According to the DFARS, 
 
Counterfeit part means— 
 1. An unauthorized copy of substitute part that has been identified, marked, and/or altered 
 by a source other than the part’s legally authorized source and has been misrepresented to 
 be from a legally authorized source;  
 2. An item misrepresented to be an authorized item of the legally authorized source, or  
 3. A new, used, outdated, or expired item from a legally authorized source that is 
 misrepresented by any source to the end-user as meeting the requirements for intended 
 use. (DFARS 202.101) 
 
Note that the DoD’s definition of counterfeit part includes what, in the commercial sector, would 
be described simply as “nonconforming.” According to subparagraph 3 of the new DFARS rule, 
a counterfeit part includes new items “misrepresented by any source to the end-user as meeting 
the performance requirements for the intended use.” Livingston (2013) noted that this definition 
could include “an out of spec item due to a temporary lapse of manufacturing and testing process 
control” (p. 5).  
 
The fact that the DFARS conflates the definition of counterfeit with nonconformance calls into 
question Section 818 policy regarding contractor liability in that prior to its passage, cost-
reimbursement for nonconforming parts “could not be denied for reasons other than fraud, lack 
of good faith, or willful misconduct” (FAR 52.246-3(h)). It appears, then, that the DoD has 
acknowledged that holding contractors completely liable for the unintentional inclusion of 




It is ironic that this tacit acknowledgement is based on the long-standing practice of reimbursing 
contractors for nonconforming parts. Although the purchase and/or manufacture of 
nonconforming parts may be largely unavoidable, common sense dictates that remediation costs 
are the responsibility of the contractor who manufactured, oversaw the manufacture, or 
purchased the nonconforming parts. In the commercial sector, manufacturers regularly make 
decisions regarding nonconforming shipments, none of which entail additional payments from 
the customer. In fact, Howton (2012) asserted that by treating nonconforming parts as an 
inevitable part of doing business—versus a nuisance or distraction—manufacturers can realize 
significant savings by minimizing scrapped shipments. A firm’s engineering team can quickly 
determine whether the nonconforming parts are still adequate or whether a simple design 
modification can be made. Often, delaying production is not cost effective if the risk is minimal. 
 
With regard to actual counterfeit parts (i.e., fake parts or parts that have been intentionally 
manipulated by the source), the DoD must develop realistic policy that recognizes the difficulty 
and expense that contractors face in attempting to reduce the risk to zero, and the impact that this 
might have on overall system quality. Just as it is impractical to think that the commercial 
sector’s quality control systems can eliminate nonconforming parts altogether, it is unrealistic to 
believe that prevention processes will eliminate the incidence of counterfeit parts in the DoD 
supply chain. 
 
To be sure, nonconforming parts find their way into DoD systems more often that one might 
imagine, especially if rigorous quality control is lacking. In fact, one might argue that the high 
incidence of nonconforming parts in weapons systems is a consequence of the DoD’s willingness 
to provide reimbursement. In its scathing review of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, for 
instance, the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG; 2013) concluded that the program “did not 
sufficiently implement or flow down technical and quality management system requirements to 
prevent the fielding of nonconforming hardware and software” (p. i) The report included the 
following summary: 
We wrote 363 findings that identified a total of 719 issues for the six contractor 
assessments performed. There were multiple issues identified in most of the findings with 
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[sic] the majority of issues were violations of the AS9100C Quality Management System 
standard. For each of the assessments, we classified the findings as major 
nonconformances, minor nonconformances, or opportunities for improvement (OFIs). 
Each finding received an additional technical review for accuracy and classification. 
(DoDIG, 2013, p. 6) 
 
Regarding nonconforming parts and components, the DoDIG (2013) recorded numerous 
deficiencies, including the following: 
• “airframes measured using the laser alignment system routinely did not meet mate and 
alignment drawing requirements” (p. 17); 
 
• “Lockheed Martin personnel were using discrepant sealant mixing equipment for 
production” (p. 23); 
 
• “composite cumulative adhesive shelf-life times were not recorded for some composite 
materials” (p. 23); 
 
• “the liquid shim application process was not in compliance with documented procedures” 
(p. 23); and  
 
• “drill bit life was not being tracked. Drill bit life should be tracked to ensure dimensional 
compliance” (p. 23). 
In the case of the F-35, the failure to apply rigorous quality assurance has cost the DoD untold 
billions of dollars, which it will not recuperate given current policy. Holding contractors liable 
for parts and product nonconformance and improving contractor oversight through the hiring and 
training of an expanded government acquisition workforce will go a long way toward correcting 
deficient quality control systems. But holding contractors responsible for the inclusion of 
counterfeit parts that have been willfully and deceitfully manipulated, all while providing 





COUNTERFEIT GOODS – ELECTRONIC PARTS 
 
With regard to any electronic parts procured by or on behalf of Seller for the Goods, Seller shall 
meet the following additional requirements:  
 
i. Seller shall have a counterfeit electronic parts control plan that meets the intent of SAE 
standard AS5553A (Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, 
and Disposition dated 2013-01).  
ii. If Buyer or Seller suspects that Seller has procured counterfeit electronic parts, Seller shall 
quarantine such parts and make them available for investigation by appropriate U.S. Government 
authorities.  
ii. Seller shall procure electronic parts from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) or its 
authorized (or franchised) distributor. In the event that Seller cannot procure electronic parts 
from the OCM or its authorized (or franchised) distributor, Seller shall obtain Buyer’s written 
approval prior to procuring electronic parts from any party other than the OCM or its authorized 
(or franchised) distributors. With such request, Seller shall provide a plan for inspecting and 
testing such parts to ensure that they do not constitute Counterfeit Goods.  
iii. Seller shall maintain all traceability and OCM-compliance documentation for electronic parts 
at its facility for seven (7) years from completion of this contract, or such other period as 
required elsewhere in this Contract, and make such documentation available to Buyer at its 
request.  
iv. Seller shall include the substance of this article, including this flow down requirement, in all 
subcontracts awarded by Seller for work under this Contract. 
Figure 13. Boeing’s (2013) flowdown requirement for detection and prevention of counterfeit goods  
 
Although the DFARS guidance is deficient in some respects, some of the criticism aimed at the 
supplement is clearly misguided. According to the supplement, firms that are not subject to cost 
accounting standards because of their smaller size are not required by law to establish and 
maintain a detection and prevention system. Representatives of large firms have taken aim at this 
exception, pointing out that because the vast majority of suppliers associated with the sale of 
suspect counterfeit parts are small, lower level sub-contractors, independent distributors, or 
brokers, the law should require that these entities maintain anti-counterfeit systems.  
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Livingston (2013) noted that prime contractors are “frequently systems architects and systems 
integrators who may not be involved in the direct procurement of electronic components; their 
lower tier suppliers tend to be in a more effective position to implement counterfeit electronic 
part avoidance and detection practices” (p. 2). Although this may be a true statement, it does not 
follow that these smaller entities should be legally required to implement an anti-counterfeit 
system. Prime and upper-tier contractors are responsible for the work of subcontractors, by 
definition. Indeed, one can argue that the prime contractor is in the “more effective position” to 
design, implement, and oversee the appropriate anti-counterfeit systems and ensure that the 
necessary components of these systems are flowed down appropriately. Large firms, it might be 
argued, were seeking a legal mandate in order to avoid the leg work of establishing flow-down 
requirements, monitoring subcontractors and suppliers, and ensuring compliance. 
Large contractors can and should require their subcontractors and suppliers to take steps to avoid 
counterfeit parts and may go so far as to hold these lower-tier entities partially or fully liable for 
remediation in the event that counterfeit parts are discovered. Moreover, the flow down of anti-
counterfeit measures is already a component of the SAE standards and is one of the elements of 
an adequate counterfeit detection system per Section 818. Figure 13 presents a list of flow-down 
requirements used by Boeing when hiring contractors. 
Amendments to Section 818  
It appears that Congress has come to realize that the incidence of counterfeit parts cannot be fully 
eliminated. Contractors, on occasion, must rely on suppliers other than OEMs. Moreover, the 
continued ambiguity surrounding the term “trusted supplier” is a further acknowledgement of 
how difficult it is to categorize sources. The critical nature of the component, differing 
calculations of risk versus benefit, and time sensitivity inform, to some extent, the level of “trust” 
assigned to a given supplier. Accordingly, Section 833 of the 2013 NDAA includes amendments 
to Section 818. The section was amended to read as follows: 
 The cost of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts and the 
 cost of rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of 
 such parts are not allowable costs under Department contracts, unless— 
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  (i) the covered contractor has an operational system to detect and avoid counterfeit parts 
 and suspect counterfeit electronic parts that has been reviewed and approved by the 
 Department of Defense … (ii) the counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit 
 electronic parts were provided to the contractor as Government property … and 
 (iii) the covered contractor provides timely notice to the Government. 
 
The amended version is an improvement over the original. However, the law remains deficient in 
some areas. Of greatest concern, there is still a lack of clarity with regard to what constitutes an 
adequate detection and prevention system. Additionally, some of Section 818’s initial “actions 
following assessment” have not been fully addressed. For example, the DoD has yet to issue or 
revise remedial actions to be taken in the case of a supplier “who has repeatedly failed to detect 




VI. Recommendations & Conclusion 
The threat of counterfeit parts within the DoD’s supply chain is real. We can anticipate that that 
threat will only escalate over time—with potentially serious consequences. However, as 
previously stated, for the foreseeable future, the DoD can expect to continue to face budgetary 
challenges. Therefore, the DoD must be ever mindful of solutions that will have unacceptable 
budgetary impacts; it is critical that the DoD find an appropriate and acceptable balance between 
risks and costs.  
Recommendations 
This balance is reflected in the recommendations provided, which fall into three high-level 
categories: (1) strengthen standards, (2) implement stronger preventive measures, and (3) 
develop a long-term strategy.  
Strengthen Standards  
• The DoD should require contractors to rely on recognized standards, such as SAE 
AS5553, in devising their counterfeit detection and mitigation procedures.  
Currently, contractors cannot be sure that their detection and prevention systems will 
qualify for government approval. Moreover, there is no process to secure or document 
this approval. By requiring contractors to adhere to standards, there is less ambiguity, 
which makes it easier for contractors to design processes, and for the DoD to approve and 
verify these processes. 
 
Is should be noted that in the case of electronic parts, the requirements of standard 
AS5553 are “generic and intended to be applied or flowed down through the supply chain 
to all organizations that procure electronic parts and/or assemblies, regardless of type, 





• DoD program managers should partner with program contractors to determine an 
appropriate, individualized, risk-based approach to counterfeit mitigation that 
adheres to established standards. 
Determining risk is a qualitative/quantitative process of combining three evaluated 
components, including threats (likelihood of occurrence), vulnerabilities (weaknesses or 
gaps in security from established standards, a measure of security effectiveness), and 
consequences (impact of adverse occurrences) 
This recommendation is in line with Standard AS5553, which states explicitly that “the 
mitigation of fraudulent/counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical parts in 
this standard is risk-based and will vary depending on the desired performance or 
reliability of the equipment/hardware.” 
With this in mind, the DoD should consider assigning weighted scores (similar to NASA) 
to contractors. The qualifying threshold could vary depending on the nature of the 
program and the specific priorities with regard to cost and risk.  
• The DoD should enforce quality assurance standards, recognizing that 
nonconforming parts threaten weapons system integrity and may lead to costly 
remediation. 
The DoD often reimburses contractors for rework and corrective action in the case of 
nonconforming parts. Although the occasional purchase and/or manufacture of such parts 
may be largely unavoidable, common sense dictates that remediation costs are the 
responsibility of the contractor who manufactured, oversaw the manufacture, or 
purchased the nonconforming parts.  
The NDAA conflates the definitions of nonconforming parts and counterfeit parts. But a 
distinction must be drawn. The key difference is that the latter entails some form of 
willful deception on the part of the supplier that manipulates or manufactures the 
counterfeit item. Because the DoD often requires parts and components that are no longer 
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available through the OEM, upper-tier contractors turn to subcontractors, brokers, or 
other sources whose suppliers may engage in dishonest practices. Because subcontractors 
and brokers often rely on multiple suppliers to meet DoD demand, determining the 
provenance of counterfeits is exceedingly difficult, and given DoD budgetary constraints, 
it is unreasonable to anticipate the complete elimination of counterfeits from upper-tier 
contractors’ supply chains. Simply, counterfeit elimination is unaffordable. Accordingly, 
it seems only fair that the cost of remediation be shared, provided that the contractor has 
in place a rigorous counterfeit detection and prevention system that is functioning 
properly. 
Implement Stronger Preventive Measures 
• The DoD should, where appropriate, encourage the use of existing deterrents (e.g., 
tamper-proof packaging, x-ray inspection) while developing new anti-counterfeiting 
technologies. 
The use of tamper-proof packaging, holograms, invisible printing, and so forth in the 
pharmaceutical industry has proven remarkably effective at reducing the incidence of 
counterfeit drugs in developed markets, particularly for high value and critical items. 
DoD suppliers could use tamper-proof packaging and other safeguards to transport items 
produced by OEMs and other trusted suppliers in addition to items that have been tested 
in order to ensure supply-chain integrity. These safeguards would protect sensitive 
electronic parts and components in two ways: they prevent the insertion of malicious 
functionality and guarantee the legitimacy of the part or component (through the use of 
unique packaging). 
At the same time, the DoD should encourage the development of universal standards with 





• Debar suppliers who repeatedly furnish parts or components containing counterfeit 
parts.  
As discussed, it is not the role of the DoD to supervise contractors’ suppliers. Ideally, 
contractors’ detection and prevention systems will deter “repeat offenders” from 
furnishing counterfeits. However, if a supplier continues to engage in practices—
willfully, unintentionally, or as a consequence of indifference—that lead to the inclusion 
of counterfeit parts in DoD systems, the supplier should be barred from conducting 
business with the DoD and its contractors.  
 
• The DoD should require foreign companies to report suspect counterfeits using the 
GIDEP and provide penalties for non-compliance. 
Currently, only U.S. and Canadian companies may participate in the GIDEP. However, 
suppliers and subcontractors from across the globe provide parts, components, and 
systems to the DoD. These parties should participate in reporting counterfeit and suspect 
counterfeit parts.  
It is therefore essential that the DoD and other government agencies work to ensure that 
the GIDEP is sufficiently robust to serve as the central mandatory reporting mechanism 
for counterfeit electronic parts. 
Develop a Long-Term Strategy  
• The DoD should focus on best value, as opposed to lowest cost, in its acquisition of 
critical technologies. 
 
The DoD has responded to recent budgetary pressures by increasing their reliance on 
lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) criteria in assessing offerors’ submissions. 
For any given solicitation, the decision to use the LPTA source selection process is 
identified in the request for proposals. The DoD is then bound to award the contract to 
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the vendor that offers the lowest evaluated price, provided that the proposal meets 
established technical threshold requirements.  
Under LPTA, there is no need to perform trade-off analysis or to compare the specific 
technical solutions provided by multiple vendors. As a result, when using LPTA as the 
source selection criteria, there is a greater risk that the selected vendor may not provide 
the best-value service or product to the customer. Firms offering lower prices may have 
fewer, or less experienced, employees, unreliable supply chains, or less effective quality 
control processes—factors that may contribute to a higher incidence of counterfeits. 
Moreover, these factors are typically excluded from consideration under LPTA. The DoD 
should refrain from “buying cheap” for critical technologies because in the end, the long-
term costs are often too high. 
• The DoD should minimize the impact of obsolescence by using (to the extent 
possible) parts and components for which multiple sources exist. Where this is not 
possible, the DoD must develop a robust obsolescence management strategy. 
The DoD should require its contractors to mitigate the threat of parts obsolescence by 
relying on parts for which multiple, reputable, sources exists. In addition, contractors 
should  be required to ensure that a common-build standard is maintained throughout each 
production run of a part or component in order to reduce the risk of obsolescence. These 
requirements should be built into the uniform standards for counterfeit detection and 
prevention issued by the DoD.  
In addition, parts used in design should be tracked for obsolescence issues throughout the 
system life cycle. This helps ensure the availability of parts by providing sufficient lead-
time to develop the best resolutions to sustain fielded systems and reduce life-cycle costs. 
Many part-tracking databases are available to provide information concerning when a 
part is discontinued by its manufacturer. 
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• The U.S. should strive to retain its design capabilities for critical technologies.
Globalization may lead to some loss of expertise in production of defense industrial 
goods. Over time, this could pose a significant problem. For instance, protectionists 
suggest that the DoD and American industry might be unable to judge the quality of 
foreign-produced goods, or that in the event of a global calamity, the United States might 
find it very difficult to move production back to the domestic industrial base. However, 
the solution to these problems is relatively straightforward: The United States must 
ensure that it retains the ability to design and produce critical technologies.  
Yet critics assert that America can only retain said capabilities by eschewing 
globalization and focusing on domestic design and production. This assertion relies on 
the observation that the emergence of truly transformative innovation seems to occur 
most readily within an environment that facilitates the gradual refinement of products. 
But this is largely the American paradigm. Although there is no doubt that it has led to 
great technical innovation, there are other models of success. In Japan, for example, 
transformative innovation is rare. Rather, Japan is well known for improving 
technologies that were initially designed in other countries. As a result, the Japanese 
consistently rank higher than the United States in technical industries such as electronics, 
automotive, and materials development. Clearly, then, there is no reason to think that the 
United States must maintain all of its current design and production capabilities in a 
particular field in order to integrate, and even improve, new technologies. In addition, 
more deliberative, global monitoring of new technologies, by both the DoD and industry, 
should allow the United States to keep pace with global innovation. 
Conclusion 
The threat of counterfeit parts within the DoD’s supply chain is real and will only escalate over 
time, with potentially serious consequences. In order to reduce this threat, he DoD and its 
industry partners will have to work together to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, at an 
affordable cost. Although both parties may have the best intentions, it is essential that any 
incentives, penalties, and rewards are properly aligned in order to produce the desired outcome, 
t
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